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NOTE
DEFINING "MEDICAL CARE": THE KEY TO
PROPER APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAL
EXPENSE DEDUCTION
First enacted by Congress in 1942, the medical expense deduction of
the federal personal income tax is intended to allow the deduction from
gross income of a taxpayer's expenditures, above a certain threshold, which
are for "medical care." ' By far the greatest source of litigation concerning
this deduction has been dispute over what constitutes medical care. 2
The resulting court decisions and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
rulings defining medical care have been at the least inconsistent and perhaps
unconstitutional as well. Particularly with regard to expenditures for unusual
treatments and for elective surgery, the decisions and rulings evidence a lack
of familiarity with the policy choices behind the medical expense deduction
provisions. This Note will examine the application of the medical expense
deduction in light of its supporting policy bases and the evident congression-
al intent behind its enactment. Moreover, an effort will be made to suggest a
workable, policy-rooted analysis which should clarify future determinations
of when an expense is deductible as one for medical care.
I. PRELUDE TO DEFINING MEDICAL CARE: THE POLICY BEHIND
THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
Current legal literature provides several views of the principal policy
choices behind the allowance in section 213 of the tax code 3 of the medical
expense deduction. Under one view, this deduction constitutes a "tax
expenditure," the equivalent of a direct government subsidy of individual
medical care expenses in the amount of the reduction in revenue that the
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1942, S. REP. NO. 1631,77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1631];
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Andrews].
1. S. REP. No. 1631 at 6. See I.R.C. § 213, quoted in note 3 infra.
2. See Fisher, What Constitutes a Medical Deduction; Medical Dependency; Sick Pay, 21
N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 169, 172 (1963).
3. The key operative portion of section 213 provides:
(a) Allowance of deduction.-There shall be allowed as a deduction the follow-
ing amounts, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise-
(1) the amount by which the amount of the expenses paid during the taxable
year . . . for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, and dependents ...
exceeds 3 percent of the adjusted gross income. . ..
For the statutory definition of "medical care," see .text accompanying note 36 infra.
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deduction produces. 4 The tax expenditure analysis, popular in the Treasury
Department, views most tax deductions as indirect subsidies which are
alternatives to budget outlays, credit assistance or other instruments of
public policy. 5 The medical expense deduction is thus seen as a means of
accomplishing the non-tax objective of providing for individual medical
care.
6
The allowance of an income tax deduction, however, is not a means
well-suited to the achievement of direct government support for the costs of
personal health care. Since the amount of government assistance a deduction
provides is determined by the individual taxpayer's marginal tax rate, 7 the
section 213 "subsidy" is most beneficial to the relatively wealthier taxpay-
ers in higher tax brackets. 8 Concomitantly, the deduction "subsidy" renders
little or no aid to those in greatest need of subsidization-the poor.9
Moreover, medical expenses themselves are regressive in character.' 0 Be-
cause liquid assets are concentrated toward the upper end of the income
scale, the loss of current income caused by medical expenses is a much
greater hardship for the poorer citizen. 1 Any "subsidy," then, provided by
the medical expense deduction will bypass those who need it most. 12
4. See Surrey, Federal Income'Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace
Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 369 (1970):
"The present tax system through the tax deduction for medical expenses provides federal
financial assistance to meet above average medical expenses." Treasury Department officials
compile tax expenditure budgets which set out the revenue losses of various tax provisions-
such as section 213-as though they were direct expenditures by the government. See, e.g.,
Special Analysis of Tax Expenditures From President.Ford's Budget for Fiscal 1978, Special
Andlysis F, Tax Expenditures, 11 BNA DAILY TAX REPORT J-1 (Jan. 17, 1977).
5. Special Analysis of Tax Expenditures from President Ford's Budget for Fiscal 1978,
Special Analysis F, Tax Expenditures, supra note 4; see [19681 SEC. OF THE TREAS. ANN. REP.
OF THE STATE OF THE FINANCES 327, 329-30 (guidelines for Treasury Department analysis of the
income tax). See also The 1969 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the Joint
Economic Committee, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 11-31 (1969) (statement of Joseph W. Barr,
Secretary of the Treasury).
6. See Surrey, supra note 4, at 369.
7. Id. An incoie tax deduction, such as provided for in section 213, will reduce the
individual's tax bill by a percentage of the deducted amount equal to the individual's tax rate.
8. Since the deduction will reduce an individual's tax bill by a percentage of the deducted
amount equal to his tax rate, the wealthier taxpayer in a higher income bracket will receive a
greater benefit from an amount deducted. The three percent floor to the section 213 medical
expense deduction, however, mitigates this upside down effect by disallowing deductions for
medical expenses unless the total exceeds three percent of the taxpayer's gross income. See B.
BIrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 189 (4th ed. 1972).
9. Individuals who pay little or no income taxes receive little or no benefit from the
deduction. Moreover, since it is an itemized deduction, see I.R.C. §§ 62-63, it provides no
"subsidy" for persons taking the standard deduction.
10. See Jensen, Rationale of the Medical Expense Deduction, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 274, 277
(1954).
11. Id.
12. For additional criticism of the tax expenditure concept of deductions, see Andrews 3 10-
11; Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies'" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
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A second rationale frequently offered to justify the section 213 medical
expense deduction relies on the deduction's effect as a "tax incentive"
which influences private spending behavior by encouraging medical care
expenditures. 13 Allowance of a deduction for medical expenditures is view-
ed as a stimulus to the purchase of health care since the government is
picking up part of the cost.' 4 The efficacy of the section 213 deduction for
this purpose, however, is limited. The higher-income taxpayer would pur-
chase necessary medical care with or without the deduction and thus needs
no incentive. The poor, since they reap little or no benefit from the medical
expense deduction, are given no incentive to purchase health care. As is the
case for the "tax expenditure" argument, "tax incentive" seems a perverse
rationale for the deduction. It provides no stimulus for the poor who cannot
afford medical care and who have no income against which to apply
deductions. 15
Both the "tax expenditure" and "tax incentive" rationales are inade-
quate justifications for a medical expense deduction because each focuses on
concerns extraneous to the taxation system itself which are best dealt with
outside that system. 6 The non-tax goal of providing for and encouraging
medical care for the public would be better and more equitably achieved
through a national health insurance system. A more persuasive rationale for
the deduction, developed by Professor William D. Andrews, 17 is that the
deduction of extraordinary medical expenses effectuates intrinsic personal
income tax ideals by insuring that only "real income" comprises the income
tax base.
The "money" or "source" income of a taxpayer-that is, the aggre-
gate financial gain from all sources 1S-does not provide an ideal base upon
which to apportion tax burdens. Taxpayers with identical money incomes
244 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to
Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969). See also Stem, Uncle Sam's Welfare Program for
the Rich, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
13. See TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expendi-
tures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
14. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
15. See, e.g., B. BITrKER & L. STONE, supra note 8, at 189.
16. See Andrews 311. Politicians, however, would appear to benefit from the characteriza-
tion of the medical expense deduction as a "tax expenditure." Thus, President Eisenhower
appeared a champion of the public by proposing a lowering of the five percent floor to a three
percent floor. Said the late President, "The present tax allowances for unusual medical
expenses are too limited to cover the many tragic emergencies which occur in too many
families." Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1955, [1954] PuB. PAPERS 114,
at 92.
17. See Andrews.
18. See I.R.C. § 61. Gross income is a rough equivalent of "money" or "source" income.
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may, in fact, have quite disparate abilities to spend and consume. It would
be a violation of the principle of horizontal equity' 9 to tax at the same rate
two individuals where, for example, one incurs higher costs to produce his
income and therefore has less money to save or spend on consumer pur-
chases. For this reason, Henry Simons' definition of "real income" as the
sum of a taxpayer's yearly aggregate personal consumption plus net ac-
cumulation of goods and services20 is generally accepted by scholars and
commentators as the ideal base upon which to apportion income tax bur-
dens. 21 The primary purpose for allowing tax deductions, as Professor
Andrews views them, is to effectuate the intrinsic tax goal of achieving an
ideal income tax base by adjusting money income so that it equals yearly
personal consumption plus accumulation. 22 When, for whatever reason, a
taxpayer's yearly "real income" amounts to less than his money income, a
deduction in the amount of the difference is required. 23
The sum of yearly accumulation plus consumption provides an ideal
index of the relative increase in material well-being on the basis of which tax
burdens may be distributed. 24 The accumulation component includes the
value of all those rights to property and services added to the taxpayer's
store of wealth during the tax period. The personal consumption component,
on the other hand, includes all the taxpayer's ultimate, 25 potentially benefi-
cial expenditures 26 made as a result of personal choices from among the
many gratifications (goods or services) available in the distributive sector.
This refined definition of personal consumption excludes, for example,
19. Horizontal equity means, simply, that taxpayers with equal abilities to pay should be
taxed at equal rates.
20. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938): "Personal income may be defined
as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question."
21. See Andrews 313.
22. See Andrews 330-31. As a practical matter, the income tax base calculation must begin
with source or money income since taxes are initially collected through the employer withhold-
ing system.
23. See Andrews 325. Conversely, it should be noted that if a taxpayer's consumption and
accumulation include substantial items not paid for from either current earnings, or savings,
these items should be added as an adjustment to money income. See H. SIMONS, supra note 20,
at 51, 55, 110-24.
24. Andrews 335.
25. "Ultimate" expenditures, as contrasted with "intermediate" expenditures, are those
purchases of goods and services which have potential to materially benefit the taxpayer, as
opposed to expenditures which are merely a step toward producing income or maintaining the
status quo. Ordinary and necessary business expenses are generally considered intermediate
expenses, while expenditures for vacations or clothing are generally held to be examples of
ultimate expenditures. No precise line can be drawn between the two. See Andrews 322.
26. A potentially beneficial expenditure is one that theoretically goes beyond placing an
individual in a whole, status quo position. It is a purchase in the distributive sector made by
choice.
[Vol. 1977:909
MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
everyday business expenses because they are intermediate in nature 27 and
theoretically provide no benefit to the taxpayer other than to aid in the
production of money income.28 A deduction should thus be allowed from
money income for the ordinary and necessary expenses of conducting a
business, for money income exceeds aggregate personel consumption plus
accumulation by at least the amount of these expenses.
29
For similar reasons, extraordinary medical expenditures should be
excluded from the consumption component of the tax base. Extraordinary
expenditures for health care are not the result of voluntary choices among
gratifications in the distributive sector, but are instead involuntary, inter-
mediate expenditures based upon a malady-created need. The difference in
magnitude of expenditures for medical care between taxpayers in otherwise
similar circumstances reflects differences in need rather than choices among
gratifications. 30 Expenditures for medical care are involuntary in the sense
that they are necessitated by ailment or illness. They are also intermediate,
since they do not increase a taxpayer's material well-being, except insofar as
personal health, once poor, has been improved. Usually, the taxpayer is at
most made whole by the expenditure, not made better off. The taxpayer with
extraordinary medical expenses will thus realize less of an increase in
material well-being than his co-worker with an identical money income who
has no extraordinary medical expenses. 3 1 A deduction for medical expenses,
then, results in a more ideal tax base because expenditures which are not
properly characterized as personal consumption are subtracted from money
income.
The legislative history of the medical expense deduction discloses no
clear rationale for the allowance of the deduction. The reports of the Senate
Finance Committee suggest congressional concern that the deduction be
confined to expenditures which are "extraordinary" 32 and precipitated by a
"defect." ' 33 This may indicate congressional support for Professor An-
drews' view of the deduction, in that "extraordinary" expenditures made
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Given two taxpayers with equal money incomes, the increase in material well-being of
Taxpayer I who has business expenses will be less than that of Taxpayer II who has none.
Although Taxpayer I's expenditures may be greater in amount, the sole effect of his business
expenditures is to produce money income. His ability to consume and accumulate, in the sense
of making voluntary choices among gratifications in the distributive sector, will be reduced vis-
a-vis Taxpayer II in the amount of Taxpayers I's business expenditures. Thus, Taxpayer I
ought to be allowed a deduction equal to the amount of his business expense, for this is the
amount by which his money income exceeds his consumption plus accumulation.
29. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 165, 183, 212, 217 (deductible expenses related to the production of
income).
30. Andrews 336.
31. See note 28 supra.
32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954).
33. S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
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solely to alleviate health "defects" are intermediate and involuntary. How-
ever, other language in the reports suggests that the deduction was enacted
for humanitarian, tax expenditure purposes. 34
The important point is, however, that Professor Andrews' analysis is
the only rationale which justifies the deduction in terms of goals intrinsic to
our system of income taxation. Section 213 is neither an effective subsidy
nor a good incentive. The ideal tax base is a dollar amount corresponding as
closely as possible to a taxpayer's ability to pay. 35 A taxpayer with involun-
tary intermediate expenses simply does not have the same ability to spend
and save as another taxpayer with an equal money income and no such
expenses. Deductions for such things as medical expenses are justified
adjustments to money income which bring the latter in line with a tax base
founded upon ability to pay.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES "MEDICAL CARE"?
The broad language of section 213(e) defines medical care as amounts
paid for:
(A) the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body,
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care
referred to in subparagraph (A), or
(C) for insurance. . covering medical care referred to in sub-
paragraphs (A) and (B). 36
Section 213 is an exception carved out of the general rule of section
262, which prohibits deductions for personal, living or family expenses. 37
These latter expenses ought to be taxed because they are expenses for
personal consumption. 38 Underlying the overall purpose of section 213 is
the premise that medical care expenses are something other than personal
expenses-that to constitute a medical care expense, an expenditure must be
34. The Senate Finance Committee's report recommending enactment of Section 23(x) of
the Revenue Bill of 1942, the predecessor to section 213, stated that the proposal was "in
consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing
emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of health and morale."
S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
35. See generally Jensen, supra note 10.
36. I.R.C. § 213(e).
37. I.R.C. § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
38. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that at least a certain level
of such expenditures may be viewed as involuntary since all persons must maintain a minimum
level of existence regardless of their choices or desires. Since all persons must maintain this
minimum level of existence, however, a tax deduction is not necessary to preserve horizontal
equity.
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intermediate in nature, at most returning the taxpayer to a status quo, a
whole position of good health. 39 Thus, expenditures which are not for the
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of a specific defect-even if they be for
the general improvement of one's health-should not constitute medical
care expenses.' So limiting the definition of medical care expenses allowed
by the deduction comports with Professor Andrews' conception of deduc-
tions as a means of securing an ideal tax base of yearly personal consump-
tion plus accumulation.
Characterizing a particular expense as either "medical" or "personal"
is difficult.41 Essentially, it involves a finding of fact. 42 Fundamental to the
characterization is a determination of first, whether an expenditure is direct-
ed to a "defect," and second, whether it is for one of the purposes
enumerated in section 213(e)(1)(A).43 For example, expenditures for health
club facilities, although they improve the general health of an individual, are
generally held non-deductible because the costs are not incurred in response
to a specific defect.' Similarly, food and lodging expenses incurred in
obtaining medical treatment away from home generally do not constitute
medical care, 45 unless incurred as a necessary incident to in-patient hospital
care, 46 since they are ordinary living expenses, not expenses for one of the
purposes enumerated in section 213(e)(1)(A).
39. L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 583-84 (1949), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950). "Congress made it very clear that the benefit
of the deduction it was creating for 'medical expenses' was in no way to encompass items which
were primarily personal living expenses." 12 T.C. at 584.
40. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
41. Thus, in one of the first cases to construe section 213, the Tax Court, in L. Keever
Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 584-85 (1949), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Commissioner v. Stringham,
183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950), stated:
The real difficulty arises in connection with determining the deductibility of expenses
which, depending upon the peculiar facts of each case, may be classified as either
"medical" or "personal" in nature. There would seem to be little doubt that the
expense connected with items which are wholly medical in nature and which serve no
other legitimate function in everyday life is incurred primarily for the prevention or
mitigation of disease. On the other hand, it is obvious that many expenses are so
personal in nature that they may only in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary
personal expenses and acquire deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of disease. Therefore, it appears that . . . where the
expenses sought to be deducted may be either medical or personal in nature, the
ultimate determination must be primarily one of fact.
42. 12 T.C. at 585.
43. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
44. See, e.g., Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. I (C. D. Cal. 1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969).
45. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 32, at 35: "A new definition of medical expense is
provided which allows the deduction of only transportation expenses for travel prescribed for
health, and not the ordinary living expenses incurred during such a trip." The Sixth Circuit has
interpreted congressional intent to allow the deduction of food and lodging expenses incurred in
transit away from home as transportation costs. Morris C. Montgomery, 51 T.C. 410 (1968),
aff'd, 428 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1970).
46. But see Kelley v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1971) (when, due to hospital
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The attempt to define medical care has produced a group of cases and
rulings that are in hopeless conflict. Nevertheless, a rational and consistent
application of section 213 is possible through adherence to express congres-
sional intent and the only rational justification for the deduction-the
achievement of horizontal equity through use of a more ideal tax base. In
order to demonstrate that the section 213 definition of medical care can be
consistently applied, this Note will proceed to examine those factual situa-
tions which raise the most difficult problems under section 213, in particular
the issues presented by elective surgical expenses and unusual treatments.
Ill. WHAT IS A "DEFECT"?
A. The Elective Surgery Rulings.
Congress made it clear that an expense was for medical care only if it
was directed at a specific health defect. Such a distinction is justified since
an expenditure directed at a defect is an involuntary, intermediate expendi-
ture which ought not be included in the ideal tax base of personal consump-
tion plus accumulation.47 Thus, one major problem in distinguishing medic-
al care expenses from personal expenses is determining what constitutes a
defect. Illustrative of the problem are the IRS rulings concerning the deduc-
tibility of elective surgical expenses. The rulings are shallow, but instruc-
tive, for they demonstrate the Service's unfamiliarity with the congressional
intent and policy justifications for allowing the medical expense deduction.
The IRS has recently ruled that surgical fees for elective non-therapeut-
ic plastic surgery are deductible medical care expenses under section 213.48
The ruling is based upon a superficial reading of the language of section
213(e)(1)(A), which includes in the definition of medical care expenses
amounts paid "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention
of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body . . ... 49 The view of the IRS is that since the purpose of the
taxpayer's cosmetic face-lifting operation was to affect a structure of the
human body, its cost is deductible as a medical care expense.50 A Treasury
Regulation cited in the ruling gives limited support to this position: regula-
tion 1.213-1(e)(1)(i) provides that amounts "paid for the purpose of affect-
ing any structure or function of the body" constitute medical care expenses
without any requirement that such expenses also be "for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.'"51 Giving disjunctive, inde-
overcrowding, taxpayer must stay and be treated at a hotel, the costs of meals and lodging
therein are deductible).
47. See notes 39 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
48. Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81.
49. I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
50. Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81, 82.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(i) (1957).
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pendent effect to the two clauses of subparagraph (A) of the statute appears
to be a proper construction, particularly sincie they are separated by the word
"or" .52 Under this interpretation, the IRS would apparently approve the
deduction of expenses associated with other elective surgical procedures,
possibly including hair transplants, cosmetic breast surgery and rhinoplasty.
That the disjunctive portions of subparagraph (A) provide independent
definitions of medical care, does not, however, necessarily mean that any
amount paid "for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body" constitutes a medical care expense under section 213. Suntan lotion,
brassieres and hair permanents all affect the structure or function of the
human body, yet no one would suggest that the statute be read to allow the
deduction of expenditures for these items as medical care. The language of
section 213 must be construed in light of the Internal Revenue Code's
general denial of deductions for personal, living or family expenses.5 3
The deduction was first introduced by the Senate Finance Committee as
part of the Revenue Bill of 1942.54 In its report, 'the Committee stated:
The term "medical care" is broadly defined to include amounts paid
for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. It
is not intended, however, that a deduction should be allowed for any
expense that is not incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation
of a physical or mental defect or illness.55
The above expression of congressional intent appears, at first blush, irrecon-
cilable with the disjunctive drafting of section 213(e)(1)(A). The Commit-
tee's intent and the language of the statute can be accommodated, however,
by construing the statutory language, "for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body," to include as medical care amounts paid
for non-illness and non-disease treatments such as those for the setting of
broken bones or for congenital birth defects, while excluding as non-
deductible all expenses not for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect.56
52. See C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 21.13, at 91 (4th ed. 1972).
53. I.R.C. § 262. In Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409, 411 (1949), the Tax Court held that the
medical expense deduction must be construed in light of "the basic concept of. . . the code
that personal, living, and family expenses are not deductible." This is consistent with the
construction given section 162(a) on business deductions; potential business expenses such as
meals, lodging and commuting expenses are held non-deductible due to the Code's provision
that personal, family and living expenses are non-deductible. See, e.g., United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299 (1967).
54. S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
55. Id. 95-96.
56. Thus the non-illness and non-disease treatments for malocclusion of teeth are held
deductible pursuant to section 213(e)(1)(A). Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89.
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The Treasury Regulations provide additional support for this construc-
tion of subparagraph (A). Immediately following the provision stating that
operations or treatments affecting any portion of the body will constitute
section 213 medical care, 57 the Regulations warn that medical care deduc-
tions must "be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness."S8
Such a construction of subparagraph (A) is also consistent with Profes-
sor Andrews' "horizontal equity" rationale for the medical expense deduc-
tion. Expenditures for procedures which are not addressed to the prevention
or remedy of a specific malady are not intermediate, involuntary expendi-
tures. The taxpayer is not merely returned to a whole, status quo position,
but rather has made a choice among expenditures of potential benefit to
himself relative to other taxpayers. Such expenditures should be treated as
personal consumption and included in the taxpayer's income tax base.
The determination of whether an expense is for medical care, then, will
often turn upon whether the expenditure was directed toward a defect as
Congress meant that term. The construction of the word defect could be a
frustrating exercise in semantics. It is arguable that congenital features of
appearance such as unattractive noses, moles, baldness and abnormally
large or small breasts are physical defects. It is submitted, however, that
such features do not constitute the "physical or mental defects" which
Congress and the regulations require unless they render the taxpayer un-
healthy or endanger his health in a specific way. In first enacting the medical
expense deduction, Congress was interested in a deduction for expenditures
for "health," not for beauty.5 9 Expenditures primarily for beautification are
for personal consumption and belong within the tax base. Elective cosmetic
surgery, unless prescribed for specific mental or physical health reasons,W
merely treats the appearance or beauty of a person, and thus does not serve
"to prevent or alleviate a. . .defect," as Congress employed these words.
Thus section 213(e)(1)(A) does not provide for the deduction of expenses
for non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery, its literal language and IRS construc-
tion notwithstanding.
The horizontal equity rationale for the medical expense deduction
would similarly require the non-deductibility of expenses for non-therapeut-
ic cosmetic surgery.61 Such expenditures reflect voluntary personal gratifi-
57. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
59. The Senate Finance Committee Report recommended enactment "in consideration
• ..of maintaining the present high level of public health . S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
60. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
61. Professor Andrews nevertheless regards the deductibility of expenses for cosmetic
surgery justifiable as a matter of administrative convenience and political reality. He states:
"Taxation in particular, like politics in general, is the art of the possible." Andrews 337.
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cation and should therefore be taxed within the personal consumption
component of Henry Simons' ideal income tax base. One would be hard-
pressed to distinguish elective expenditures for face-lifting and hair-trans-
planting from those clearly personal consumption expenditures for cosmet-
ics or wigs. 62 They are all voluntary expenditures for personal gratification,
providing relative benefit to the taxpayer beyond making him whole. 63
Expenditures for cosmetic surgery, then, ought to be deductible only
where they constitute involuntary, intermediate expenditures which, at
most, return a taxpayer to a status quo, whole position. 64 Thus, surgical
alterations of features which endanger or affect a person's health in a
specific way, such as the removal of a mole which could become cancerous,
should constitute section 213 medical care. Where substantiated mental
health problems, such as a taxpayer's genuine inability to face people due to
his appearance, necessitate cosmetic surgery, its costs should similarly be
deductible. 65 Although purely cosmetic in nature, surgery to remove scars
occasioned solely by injury should constitute section 213 medical care since
such costs are involuntary, intermediate expenses, merely returning the
taxpayer to a status quo position. Although many therapeutic operations also
make requested appearance changes upon a congenital feature, any addition-
al expense occasioned by the cosmetic alterations should not be deductible.
Only those expenditures which are intermediate in nature should be deduct-
ible under section 213.
B. The Obstetrical and Related Services Rulings.
The issue of the deductibility of elective surgical procedures also arises
in relation to expenses for childbirth or its prevention. The Treasury Regula-
tions specifically provide that obstetrical expenses are "deemed to be for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body and are therefore
paid for medical care.'' 66 In two rulings, the IRS has held that legal67
62. See note 87 infra.
63. Even the "tax expenditure" and "tax incentive" rationales for the deduction would not
support the deductibility of non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery expenditures. It is doubtful that
the government has any interest in subsidizing or encouraging expenditures for personal
beautification.
64. Non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery expenses, although not deductible under section 213,
may, in some cases, be deductible as business expenses pursuant to section 162(a) (for example,
the face-lift expenses of an aging actress).
65. An analogous approach was taken by the I.R.S. in Rev. Rul. 62-189, 1962-2 C.B. 88,
which held that expenditures for a wig are deductible as medical care expenses when prescribed
by a doctor to preserve the patient's mental health.
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
67. The Treasury Regulations state that expenses for illegal procedures or-drugs are not
deductible medical care expenses. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957). Al-
though the deductibility of illegal expenditures has not been litigated, the issue deserves brief
discussion. Under the horizontal equity rationale for the allowance of deductions, the deduc-
tion of illegal expenses would be required to achieve the ideal tax base of incremental personal
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vasectomies,6 8 abortions69 and sterilization procedures70 constitute section
213 medical care, the expenses for which are deductible. These rulings,
based solely upon the proposition that the procedures are "for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body,' '71 present the same prob-
lems of construction under section 213(e)(1)(A) as do the rulings regarding
cosmetic surgery. Specifically, it must be determined whether or not these
expenditures, which do literally "affect" a "function of the body," are for
the prevention or alleviation of a defect.
Although a pregnancy is usually voluntary, the deduction of obstetrical
expenses is justified since the employment of a doctor or midwife is
reasonably designed to prevent a "defect"--or physical health complication
in the mother. In this sense, although the pregnancy is a matter of choice and
gratification, the obstetrical expenses are very much involuntary and inter-
mediate, at most insuring a healthy delivery. The deduction of obstetrical
expenses is thus justified in the same manner as are expenses for immuniza-
tions before pleasure travel or the surgical expenses of an injured daredevil
motorcyclist. All these expenses originate in voluntary activity, 72 but are
nevertheless extraordinary expenses which are intermediate in the sense that
they only return the taxpayer to a status quo position relative to other
taxpayers .73
consumption plus accumulation. An expenditure for illegal treatment reflects a foregoing of
personal consumption in the same way as does an expenditure for legal treatments.
However, the denial of the deduction for illegal expenditures is founded upon a rationale
extraneous to the tax itself. The Regulation is best explained as an ascertainment of the overall
congressional intent not to allow the Internal Revenue laws to benefit persons engaged in illegal
activities. Thus section 162 forbids the deduction of trade or business expenses for illegal
payments and fines resulting from illegal activities. See I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g). Moreover, a
congressional intent to exclude illegal drugs and procedures from the section 213 definition of
medical care may be inferred from the fact that Congress re-enacted the medical expense
deduction provisions in 1954 fully aware of existing Treasury Regulations denying the deducti-
bility of illegal medical expenses. See former Treas. Reg. 11l, § 29.23(x)-l(d)(1), T.D. 5902,
1943 C.B. 119, 130. Even if the purpose of the medical expense deduction ought not be to
subsidize or encourage medical expenditures, it must be recognized that one effect of the
deduction is a government loss of revenue and encouragement of medical expenditure. Con-
gress hardly desires to encourage illegal activities. It would thus seem a proper ascertainment of
congressional intent, that in enacting section 213, Congress meant to deny a deduction for
illegal medical expenditures.
68. Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140.
69. Id.
70. Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76.
71. Id.; Rev. Rul. 73-201, supra note 68.
72. There is a sense in which many physical maladies are "voluntarily" incurred. For
example, one who engages in a particularly dangerous hobby or travels to disease-infested areas
can reasonably foresee that certain medical problems are likely to develop. Since life is filled
with risks and dangers in almost all endeavors, and since people do not seek physical harm, it is
logical to view all medical expenditures as involuntary costs thrust upon persons who, very
simply, would have preferred to remain healthy.
73. The deduction of obstetrical expenses is also supported under the "tax expenditure"
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The deductibility of elective, non-therapeutic abortions is harder to
justify.74 Abortion procedures are not quite analogous to professional ob-
stetrical services in that a professional delivery aids the natural pregnancy
process to birth primarily for safety reasons, while an abortion is principally
chosen as a voluntary, personal consumption expense of destroying an
unwanted fetus which is of no danger to the mother's health. Supporting the
allowance of a deduction, however, is the fact that once a fetus is conceived,
the care of a trained professional, either in delivery or abortion, is necessary
to prevent the occurrence of specific health complications in the mother. An
expenditure for a professionally administered abortion, then, is an involun-
tary deductible expense "for the prevention of . . . a physical . . .
defect." ' 75 In this light, whatever other distinctions may be made between
the two, a professionally administered abortion is designed to prevent
specific health problems in the same way as is a professionally supervised
delivery. Thus, a pregnant woman may choose from two professional
medical services: the delivery or the abortion. 76
Allowing the deduction of expenses for non-therapeutic abortions ap-
pears reasonable, moreover, since it avoids a sticky constitutional issue. In
light of the constitutional right of a woman to abort a carried fetus, 7 7 there
are equal protection considerations inherent in tax distinctions between
deliveries and abortions.78 A government decision to apply the medical
expense deduction to pregnancies, but not to non-therapeutic abortions in
the first trimester, would amount to a discrimination against a woman solely
for chobsing an abortion rather than childbirth. Such discrimination against
and "tax incentive" rationales, since Congress would presumably seek to encourage safe
pregnancies and deliveries.
74. Even the "tax expenditure" and "tax incentive" rationales for the medical expense
deduction would not justify the deduction of expenditures for elective, non-therapeutic abor-
tions. That Congress does not wish to subsidize elective abortions is illustrated by the recent
enactment of the Hyde Amendment as part of the Labor-H.E.W. Appropriation Act for 1977.
Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). The amendment prohibits Medicaid
reimbursement for abortions unless the woman's life would be endangered by carrying the fetus
to term. Abortion was excluded as a means of family planning for which funds would be
available under the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970,42 U.S.C. §
300a-6 (1970).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957); S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
76. Note the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.
1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977). In describing elective abortions as medical necessities for
Medicaid purposes the Beal court stated:
It is undoubtedly true that at the time a woman chooses to have a non-therapeutic
abortion there is a greater quantum of personal freedom than at the time she has a
therapeutic abortion or goes into labor. But there is also greater freedom of choice
involved when one decides to have a tooth cavity filled than when one is forced to
have the tooth extracted after it has abscessed.
523 F.2d at 619.
77. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Doe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
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the exercise of a constitutional right arguably violates the fifth amendment
equal protection clause. 79
Along with obstetrical and abortion expenditures, those for sterilization
and vasectomy should also be deductible. Pregnancy involves specific
health risks, discomfort, and mobility restrictions and therefore specific
defects are prevented by these contraceptive measures. Conceptually there
may be some problem in allowing deductions for vasectomies because the
only defects prevented are those which would arise in another person. This
jump to allowing the deduction of expenditures to prevent a defect in
another is justified, however, by the language of section 213(a)(1) which
provides that the deduction is available for the "medical care of the taxpay-
er, his spouse, and dependents."80 Treating vasectomies as section 213
medical care, then, is appropriate since vasectomies provide medical care to
a taxpayer's spouse by preventing the defects associated with pregnancy. 81
The deductibility of vasectomy expenses, moreover, appears justified by
considering the following analogy: a medicine which inhibits the infectious-
ness of a disease, but does nothing to cure the present victim should
constitute section 213 medical care because the expenditure is for the
prevention of a specific disease. Such an expenditure is involuntary and
intermediate in that it does not materially benefit the taxpayer relative to
other taxpayers, but fulfills a medico-societal obligation to prevent the
spread of a specific disease. The vasectomy serves a similar function in the
prevention of pregnancy-associated defects in others.
79. The recent Supreme Court decision in Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), holding
constitutional a state's denial of Medicaid benefits for elective abortions despite the fact that
the state paid for childbirth expenses, might appear on the surface to settle the issue. However,
in Maher the Court sanctioned only a state's financial "encouragement" of childbirth over
abortion. Id. at 2384. Maher explicitly reaffirmed the Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which
forbade restrictions which unduly burden the woman's right to abort a fetus. As discussed
above, the medical expense deduction is most properly viewed not as an encouragement of
medical expenditures supported by government largess, but rather as a necessary adjustment to
money (gross) income. In this context, the denial of the deduction for elective abortions will
unduly burden the taxpayer paying for an abortion by causing him to be taxed on a taxable
income figure greater than that which -would reflect his aggregate annual consumption plus
accumulation. Stated simply, a taxpayer paying for an abortion would be forced to pay higher
taxes than he should ideally pay. Thus, a denial of the deduction for abortion expenses in the
face of an allowance for childbirth expenses does not simply "encourage" childbirth over
abortion, it acts to restrict the right to an abortion by taxing expenditures therefor.
80. I.R.C. § 213(a)(1).
81. Thus the taxpayer's obtaining a vasectomy is for his spouse's medical care. This
expenditure is logically no different from his purchasing a detachable air filtration system for
his wife's home in order to prevent his wife from breathing material that harms her health.
Neither expenditure is for a procedure which touches the wife's body, but both expenditures
act to prevent specific defects in her. The expenditure for the air filtration system would be
clearly deductible. See Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307; accord, Raymond Gerard, 37 T.C.
826 (1962).
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IV. WHAT IS A "CURE"?
In a second group of decisions, the courts and the IRS have struggled to
determine whether an incurred expense is a "cure" or "treatment" for the
purposes of section 213. The decisions in this area are not only inconsistent
with one another, but some may be unconstitutional as well. s2 This section
re-examines these decisions in terms of the policy goals and congressional
intent behind the enactment of the medical expense deduction. In addition,
this section proposes a policy-rooted analysis upon which to base the
decision of whether a taxpayer's expenditure was for a treatment or cure
under section 213.
Most expenses associated with common modem American medical
treatment have been held by the courts and the IRS to constitute medical
care expenditures deductible pursuant to section 213. Thus, expenses for
services performed by a doctor or nurse, in the course of examination or
treatment, including laboratory work, x-rays or hospital care are all for
medical care and deductible.8 3
Legally procured84 medicines and drugs, whether or not requiring
prescription,8 5 also constitute medical care subject to a floor of one percent
of gross income. 86 On the other hand, expenses for cosmetics, toiletries and
sundries are personal, living expenses not includible in the "medicines and
drugs" definition of medical care.87 Similarly, food items, such as special
82. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957):
[P]ayments for the following are payments for medical care: hospital services,
nursing services (including nurses' board where paid by the taxpayer), medical,
laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services, x-rays,
medicine and drugs . . artificial teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire.
See generally Fisher, supra note 2; Skilling, Limitations to the Medical Deduction; Problems on
Reimbursement, 29 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 1359, 1362-71 (1971). For an accountant's view, see
Shemo, How to Make Sure Your Client Gets His Full Medical Expense Deduction, 10 J. TAX.
298 (1973).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957) provides that only "legally procured" medicines and
drugs constitute medical care. The validity of the regulation has not yet been litigated. The
merit of excluding expenses for illegal medical procedures of medical care is discussed in note
67 supra.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957).
86. I.R.C. § 213(b). The congressional purpose for the floor is to make "it clear that
expenditures for medicine and drugs (whether or not requiring a prescription) are taken into
account but expenditures for toiletries and sundries are not." S. REP. 1622, supra note 32, at
219; H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A59-A60 (1954). The floor, however, penalizes
the honest taxpayer who does not deduct expenses for toiletries and sufidries as expenses for
medical care, and, certainly, his expenses for medicines and drugs below one percent of his
income are as involuntary and extraordinary as are other medical treatment expenses. The
Code ought not be written to anticipate the cheater at the expense of the honest taxpayer. See
Sierk, The Medical Expense Deduction-Past, Present, and Future, 17 MERCER L. REV. 381
(1966).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.213.1(e)(2) (1957):
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diets, 88 vitamins8 9 and liquor90 do not constitute medical care unless the item
is ingested solely for the alleviation or treatment of an illness, and not
merely as a nutritional substitute. 91 Capital expenditures are held to consti-
tute deductible medical care expenses if they are primarily for the medical
care purposes set out in section 213(e)(1)(A), 92 and to the extent that the
capital asset does not constitute a permanent improvement in the value of the
taxpayer's property. 93 Since capital expenditures are likely to be of a
personal rather than medical nature, the courts have placed a burden upon
the taxpayer to demonstrate that the asset was purchased primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of a specific disease or illness. 94
A. The Havey Test.
Admitting that the common expenses of modem American medical
care are clearly within that class of expenditures that Congress intended to
reach in section 213 should not preclude the deductibility of expenses which
do not fall within the mainstream of a licensed physician's services and
prescriptions. 95 That a particular treatment is performed or prescribed by a
licensed physician simply cannot be controlling as to the issue of whether
the item or service constitutes section 213 medical care. The deductibility of
The term 'medicine and drugs'. . . shall not include toiletries or similar preparations
(such as toothpaste, shaving lotion, shaving cream, etc.) nor shall it include cosmetics
(such as face creams, deodorants, hand lotions, etc., or any similar preparation used
for ordinary cosmetic purposes) or sundry items.
88. J. Willard Harris, 46 T.C. 672 (1966); Doris v. Clark, 29 T.C. 196 (1957).
89. Princess E. L. Lingham, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 649 (1977). But cf. Marshall J. Hammons, 12
T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (1953) (deductible when prescribed by a doctor).
90. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 312.
91. In Leo R. Cohn, 38 T.C. 387 (1962), the Tax Court allowed a deduction for additional
charges incurred at restaurants for the preparation of salt-free meals made necessary by the
taxpayer's heart condition. See also Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307 (whiskey prescribed by a
physician for the relief of angina pain resulting from heart disease may qualify as a deduction).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) (1962).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) (1962) provides:
[A] capital expenditure which is related only to the sick person and is not related to
permanent improvement or betterment of property, if it otherwise qualifies as an
expenditure for medical care, shall be deductible; for example, . . . eye glasses, a
seeing eye dog, artificial teeth and limbs, a wheel chair, crutches, an inclinator or an
air conditioner which is detachable from the property .... Moreover, a capital
expenditure for permanent improvement or betterment of property which would not
ordinarily be for the purpose of medical care ... may, nevertheless, qualify as a
medical expense to the extent that the expenditure exceeds the increase in the value
of the related property ....
For a general historical perspective on the posture of the courts toward the deductibility of
capital expenditures for medical care, see Comment, Deductibility of Capital Expenditures and
Medical Expenses Under Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 36 U. COLO. L. REv.
365 (1964).
94. See, e.g., Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. I (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 413 F.2d 783
(9th Cir. 1969).
95. For example, see Riach v. Frank, 302 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962), where a deduction was
allowed for expenses incurred in installing a "hil-a-vator" (an elevator type device installed on
a hill) without the prescription of a physician.
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services pursuant to section 213 must depend upon the nature of the services
rendered, and not on the experience, qualifications or title of the person
rendering them.96
To qualify as section 213 medical care, a service rendered must be in
furtherance of one of the purposes set out in section 213(e)(1)(A).97 As
discussed in the previous section, Congress intended that the literal defini-
tion of section 213 medical care be read broadly, 98 so long as the treatment
or service was obtained primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a
specific defect or illness.99 The IRS has thus properly held that some
relatively uncommon or unusual services constitute section 213 medical
care, the expenses for which are deductible. In Revenue Ruling 55-261,100
the IRS held that medical care includes the services of chiropractors,
osteopaths and authorized Christian Science practitioners. In Revenue
Ruling 63-91,101 the IRS held that amounts paid unlicensed practitioners
such as psychotherapists can constitute deductible expenses for medical
care. The IRS has also allowed the deduction of expenses for acupuncture,
alcoholism treatment 0 3 and drug addiction clinics.104
Other decisions, however, have denied the deductibility of expendi-
tures for what might be characterized as an uncommon or unusual means of
treating a disease or defect. For example, the deductibility of expenses
incurred for treatment by native Samoan doctors10 5 and for trips to religious
healing shrines' °6 has been denied. The Tax Court has met the lack of
statutory guidelines for determining what constitutes a treatment or cure
with a frequently cited test first articulated in Edward A. Havey. 10 7 Havey
involved a taxpayer's claimed deduction of expenses for physician-advised
trips to the New Jersey coast and Arizona (these locations having been the
site of many of the taxpayer's prior vacations). In ruling that the expendi-
96. See Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (1949); George B. Wendell, 12 T.C. 161 (1949).
Thus, expenses for nursing services performed by an unlicensed or untrained nurse are held to
be deductible as medical care expenses under section 213. See, e.g., Myrtle P. Dodge, 20
T.C.M. (CCH) 1811 (1961). See also notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text.
97. For example, transportation services may constitute section 213 medical care expenses,
but only if "primarily for and essential to" a purpose set out in subparagraph (A). See I.R.C. §
213(e)(1)(B).
98. S. REP. No. 1631 at 6.
99. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957). See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying
text.
100. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307.
101. Rev. Rul. 63-91, 1963-1 C.B. 54.
102. Rev. Rul. 72-593, 1972-2 C.B. 180.
103. Rev. Rul. 73-325, 1973-2 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 63-273, 1963-2 C.B. 112.
104. Rev. Rul. 72-226, 1972-1 C.B. 96.
105. David F. Tautolo, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975).
106. Vincent P. Ring, 23 T.C. 950 (1955).
107. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
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tures for the trips were non-deductible personal expenses rather than medical
treatment for heart failure, the Havey court set out a balancing test under
which future courts were to weigh the answers to the following five ques-
tions: (1) What was the taxpayer's motive or purpose for incurring the
expense? (2) Was the expense incurred at the direction or suggestion of a
physician? (3) Did the treatment bear directly on the claimed condition?
(4) Did the treatment bear such a direct and proximate therapeutic relation
to the body condition as to justify a reasonable belief that its result would be
efficacious? (5) Was the treatment so proximate in time to the onset or
recurrence of the condition as to make one the true occasion of the other? 108
The employment of the Havey test in later Tax Court decisions has
necessarily resulted in courts making unwarranted normative judgments as
to whether certain uncommon treatments and services constitute section 213
medical care. More particularly, the Havey test forces the courts to police
the medical sciences, a task which they are unequipped to perform and
which section 213 nowhere requires. The Tax Court decisions in Vincent P.
Ring10 9 and David F. Tautolo 110 illustrate the type of normative judgments
that are compelled by employing the Havey test to determine whether an
expenditure is for a treatment or cure. A close examination of these cases
demonstrates that the Havey test, when employed outside the particular
factual situation involved in Havey, is an improper application of the
requirements of section 213.
In Ring, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's expenses incurred in a
trip to the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in France did not constitute
deductible expenditures for medical care. The taxpayer's young daughter
was afflicted with a cancerous tumor in her left leg. Surgeons performed a
complete resection of the child's leg bones to avoid amputation, but they
could not be sure for five years whether the operation had effected a
complete cure by preventing the tumor from appearing elsewhere in the
child's body. The taxpayer, a devout Catholic, decided to send his daughter
to the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes, a shrine officially recognized by the
Catholic Church for the performances of miracles in the cure of physical
ailments.' 1 ' Knowledge of the recording of miracles performed at the Shrine
influenced the taxpayer to have his child make the pilgrimage there. He was
not sure that she would be benefited by a miracle, but believed that the
108. The test, as set out, is paraphrased from the Havey opinion. Id. at 412.
109. 23 T.C. 950 (1955).
110. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975).
111. The Ring court found as fact:
Such recognition is not given without verification. The required conditions for
recognition are registration at one of the several hospitals in Lourdes, the deposit of a
certificate from the individual's home doctor, and a physical re-examination by
hospital physicians to determine whether any alleged cure has occurred at the shrine.
23 T.C. at 951.
[Vol. 1977:909
MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
spiritual aid available there would bring some improvement of her physical
condition to supplement the care rendered by the surgeon at home. Accom-
panied by her mother, the child travelled to Lourdes and each day attended
Mass, took the Shrine's baths and participated in the candle-light procession
of pilgrims. 112
For a unanimous panel of sixteen judges, Judge Johnson applied the
Havey test to hold the cost of the Lourdes pilgrimage not deductible.
Although finding as fact that the spiritual aid sought at Lourdes was for the
purpose of bringing about improvement in a specific physical condition, 113
the Ring court held that "spiritual" help to alleviate a physical defect does
not constitute medical care under the Code.114 The Ring court thus frankly
announced a normative conclusion that spiritual aid could not constitute
medical treatment.1" 5
Tautolo, a memorandum decision, held that a taxpayer's expenditures
in obtaining the treatment of Samoan tribal doctors did not constitute
medical care costs deductible pursuant to section 213. The taxpayer's wife
had suffered a massive stroke accompanied by advanced cerebral disease.
The taxpayer and his wife had consulted nearly twenty physicians, all of
whom considered the wife's case terminal. Both the taxpayer and his wife
were originally from Samoa, and with the encouragement of their relatives,
they decided to travel to Samoa to seek treatment for the wife. The couple
flew to Samoa where the wife received the treatment of native Samoan
doctors. The court found as fact that the taxpayer's sole motivation for
making the trip was to alleviate his wife's physical condition. Samoan
doctors do not attend medical school and believe in calling upon spirits and
in using medicine from plants to alleviate sickness. As are all patients, the
taxpayer's wife was treated with prayers and plant leaf massages.
Applying the Havey test in a step-by-step fashion, the Tautolo court
concluded that the treatments received from the Samoan doctors did not
constitute section 213 medical care. 116 None of the American physicians
consulted by the taxpayer recommended the trip. The treatments, the court
held, were not directed to the wife's specific condition, because all patients
of Samoan doctors receive the same type of treatment. Finally, the Tautolo
court found that the taxpayer could not have held a reasonable belief that the
treatment would be effective. While the taxpayer no doubt hoped to find a
112. Id. at 950-52.
113, Id. at 953.
114. Id. at 954.
115. Id. The Ring court nowhere mentioned or attempted to distinguish Rev. Rul. 55-261,
1955-1 C.B. 307, which holds that expenditures for treatment by a Christian Science practition-
er are deductible under section 213.
116. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200.
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cure in Samoa, his expectation of succeeding was at best minimal. 17 Thus
the Havey test mandated the court's conclusion that the Samoan treatments
did not constitute medical care.
B. Problems Under the Havey Test.
The harsh decisions in Ring and Tautolo uncover a misreading of
section 213(e)(1)(A) that is inherent in the Havey test. The Havey test
mandates a normative judgment as to the efficacy of uncommon treatments
which section 213(e)(1)(A) nowhere requires; neither does the statute re-
quire or exclude any particular mode of treatment as the Ring decision
suggests. All that section 213(e)(1)(A) requires for deductibility of an
expense is that it has been incurred "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body," 118 subject to the limitation that the
treatment be obtained primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a specific
defect or illness. 119
In Tautolo, the court, applying the third prong of the Havey test, held
that the Samoan treatments did not bear directly on the wife's specific illness
because the general nature of the treatment was the same utilized by Samoan
doctors for all their patients. 120 Because the same type of treatment is
applied in all cases, however, does not mean that the treatment rendered the
wife was not directed toward her as the particular patient being treated.
Many specific ailments can be treated with aspirin or codeine. Yet it cannot
be said that a person who takes either for pain is not addressing a particular
ailment presently suffered. While section 213 does require that a treatment
be obtained primarily to prevent or alleviate a specific defect, it does not
impose the quite different requirement that a treatment be effective with
regard to only one specific ailment. The third prong requirement of the
Havey test that the treatment "bear directly" on the claimed malady,
particularly as applied in Tautolo, forces the courts to make a normative
medical judgment not required by section 213.
The Tautolo court also applied the fourth prong of the Havey test and
concluded that the taxpayer had no reasonable expectation that his wife's
malady would be improved by the Samoan treatments. 121 Again, section 213
does not require a normative conclusion as to the efficacy of a particular
treatment. Moreover, such a requirement is fundamentally contrary to the
view of the medical expense deduction as an aid in the determination of an
117. Id.
118. I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(A).
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957). See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
120. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200.
121. Id.
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ideal personal income tax base. An unusual expenditure as a last resort for
the alleviation of a physical malady is just as much an involuntary inter-
mediate expense as is an expenditure for medical treatment that is reason-
ably likely to be efficacious. The fourth prong of the Havey test, if followed
to its logical conclusion, would preposterously mandate the nondeductibility
of all expenditures for curative treatment of terminally ill patients since no
curative treatment could reasonably be believed to be efficacious in such
circumstances.
Further, nowhere in the legislative history of the medical expense
deduction does it appear to have been contemplated that a court would
exercise normative judgments as to the efficacy of the treatments whose
costs were claimed as a tax deduction. As made clear above, congressional
concern focused upon insuring that personal, living or family expenses not
be deducted as medical expenses. 122 "Last resort" and uncommon treat-
ments hardly constitute what are commonly thought of as personal, living or
family expenses. Even more than the common medical expense, the last
resort expenditure reflects a foregoing of gratifying personal consumption
because of an involuntary, extraordinary need. Therefore, the last resort
expenditure ought not be included in the personal consumption component
of the tax base, and should result in a tax deduction for the amount
expended.
The Tax Court's decision in Ring was based upon the same analysis as
that employed in Tautolo. The Ring decision turned solely upon the court's
normative judgment that "spiritual aid" cannot constitute section 213 med-
ical care 12--even if, as was the case in Ring, there is an explicit finding of
fact that the spiritual aid was sought for the improvement of a specific
physical malady.124
The Ring court was persuaded by the fact that nowhere in section 213
is the deductibility of expenses for spiritual aid affirmatively allowed.'2
Oddly, this reasoning ignores the fact that no specific modes of treatment
are listed anywhere in the statute.126 Though the Treasury Regulations list
specific modes of treatment that are deductible, the wording of the regula-
tions makes clear that the listings are not exclusive. 127
The Ring and Tautolo decisions are problematic not only in relation to
the general policy underlying the allowance of a medical expense deduction,
122. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
123. 23 T.C. at 954. For an accountant's discussion of the Ring case, see Eulenberg,
Miracles and the Medical Expense Deduction, I 1 TAX COUNS. Q. 1 (1967).
124. 23 T.C. at 953.
125. Id. at 954.
126. See I.R.C, § 213.
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(i), (ii) (1957). Use of the word "thus" in subpart (ii) allows
the inference that the listing of treatments is by example and not exclusive.
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but also because they are flatly irreconcilable with other court and IRS
rulings on section 213. It is difficult to distinguish spiritual aid directed at a
specific malady from treatments such as psychoanalysis and trips to warm,
dry climates, the expenses for which courts have held to be deductible. 128
The IRS, which prosecuted Ring in the Tax Court, ironically ruled in the
same year that treatment by a Christian Science practitioner constitutes
section 213 medical care, the expenses for which are deductible. 129 The
therapy of the Christian Science practitioner is purely spiritual. 130 It is thus
impossible to reconcile this IRS ruling with Ring and Tautolo.
Allowing a medical expense deduction for the services of a Christian
Science practitioner while denying the deduction for spiritual treatment
pursuant to other religious tenets may, moreover, violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment. The effect of the conflicting decisions is to
financially favor the exercise of one religion over others in disregard of the
first amendment's requirement of government neutrality toward the various
religions. 131 Although the establishment clause problem could be avoided by
reversal of the IRS ruling allowing the deduction of expenses for Christian
Science practitioners, this is not desirable. The ruling appears proper.
Spiritual therapy properly constitutes section 213 medical care as defined
and intended by Congress, for it is a treatment obtained primarily to prevent
or alleviate a specific malady. 132
Ring and Tautolo stand out as incorrectly decided. The decisions,
however, are the logical result of applying the Havey test. That test is faulty
insofar as it requires the courts to substitute their judgment as to what
treatments are medically desirable and efficacious for that of the taxpayer.
Nevertheless, the decision in Havey itself was correct; a taxpayer should not
be permitted to deduct usual vacation expenses under the guise of medical
necessity. The decision denying the deduction properly turned on the per-
sonal, "non-intermediate" nature of the expense, not on its lack of efficacy.
The Havey test, particularly its fourth prong, was no more than dicta. The
question remains, however, whether there is a better test to distinguish
personal expenses from section 213 medical care expenses which would not
mandate the undesirable results reached under the Havey test.
128. David E. Starret, 41 T.C. 877 (1964) (psychoanalysis); L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C.
580 (1949), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950)
(warm climates).
129. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307.
130. See S. GOTrSCHALK, THE EMERGENCE OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
LIFE 216-17, 226-30 (1973).
131. See School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,222(1963), where the Court emphasized
the need for governmental neutrality with respect to religion, stating that "to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
132. S. REP. No. 1631 at 6. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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C. The Preferred Jacobs Approach.
The Tax Court's decision in Joel H. Jacobs133 suggests the proper test.
To constitute a deductible medical care expense, the taxpayer must prove
that the expenditure would not have been incurred but for the treatment of a
specific malady. 134 The employment of the "but for" test would mandate
the same result reached by the Tax Court under the facts in Havey, but
would not require the unwarranted normative conclusions regarding the
propriety and efficacy of uncommon treatments. Expenditures would thus
be scrutinized as follows: (1) Was the taxpayer or his dependent suffering
from the existence or probability of a disease, defect, or illness- mental or
physical? (2) Was the expenditure for the purpose of the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of the specific disease, defect, or
illness? (3) Would the expenditure not have been made by the taxpayer
were it not for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
the malady?
If affirmative answers are given to these three questions then a section
213 medical care expense deduction should be allowed. The factors high-
lighted in the Havey test, such as the taxpayer's motive or the effect of the
expenditure on the malady, may be relevant, as a matter of common sense
analysis, to answer these questions, but the Havey factors need not be
weighed in every case, and should be conclusive only if they suggest an
answer to the "but for" test of Jacobs.
The "but for" test embodies Professor Andrews' rationale for the
medical expense deduction by limiting the deduction to those expenses of a
taxpayer that are intermediate and involuntary, at most meant to return the
taxpayer to a "whole" position of good health. Those expenditures which a
taxpayer would make regardless of the threat or existence of a malady
should be treated as a taxpayer's personal consumption and included in his
tax base. The Jacobs "but for" test, moreover, would yield the identical
result reached by the Tax Court in Havey while mandating opposite, more
palatable results in Ring and Tautolo, Havey's misguided progeny. The
"but for" test allows the deduction of expenses for uncommon treatments
where they are obtained for the purpose of addressing a specific malady and
would not have been obtained were it not for the existence or threat of such
malady. Certainly, the expenditures in Ring and Tautolo fulfill the Jacobs
test requirements, while the claimed deduction in Havey ought to have been
133. 62 T.C. 813 (1974). The Jacobs court held that expenses for obtaining a divorce, even
though in the interest of the taxpayer's mental health, did not constitute deductible medical care
expenses pursuant to section 213, in that the expenses were personal since the divorce would
have been obtained regardless of the taxpayer's mental condition.
134. Id. at 819.
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denied since the taxpayer's expenditures for trips to the beach and to
Arizona would have been made regardless of the existence of a malady.
There is no evidence whatever that Congress intended that expenditures
for uncommon or unpopular treatments be non-deductible under section
213. Nor does Professor Andrews' rationale for the allowance of deductions
consider the common or uncommon nature of a treatment. Whether or not
the Havey test could possibly be applied in a manner consistent with the
reading of section 213 propounded herein, its present application suggests
that the test's ambiguous language will continue to produce anomalous
results. Except as a compilation of possible common sense areas of relevant
inquiry, the Havey test should be abandoned in favor of the Jacobs analysis
suggested above.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the congressional intent supporting the enactment of the
medical expense deduction remains largely unclear, the only policy
rationale which justifies the continued allowance of the deduction is the
horizontal equity rationale posited by Professor Andrews. Any court or
Service decision concerning section 213 medical care should thus be firmly
rooted in the horizontal equity rationale. The review of court and IRS
rulings presented in this Note suggests the dangers of applying the medical
expense deduction in a manner which is blind to its policy function within
the personal income taxation scheme as a whole. It is hoped that tax
planning, litigation and decision-making concerning what constitutes med-
ical care under section 213 will be directed away from talismanic notions of
what is medical and toward a more policy-rooted analysis of whether an
expenditure is involuntarily incurred as a result of a specific defect but for
the existence of which no expenditure would have been made.
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